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Abstract: This project investigates Indian American partisanship. Why, despite several large 
cleavages like religion and income, do most Indian Americans identify with a single party? 
Building on a long tradition of studying partisanship,  I posit that Indian-Americans share a 
group consciousness borne out of experiences of racial discrimination. This group consciousness 
drives Indian-Americans to identify as Democrats. First, I present several theories of party 
identification and evaluate their explanatory power, both theoretically and when applied to other 
groups, such as Jewish Americans and Asian-Americans. I then present an original theory of 
party identification in the Indian-American community. Next, I explore the nature of newspaper 
coverage on Indian-Americans by conducting a content analysis of New York Times and India 
Abroad articles. Finally, I use data from the 2016 CMPS to empirically test my theory. All 
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Vinod is, by all accounts, extremely wealthy (Biography in Context 2001). He moved to 
the United States to attend graduate school, settled down, and founded a company that sold 
computers in 1982. After Oracle (the computer technology company) acquired his business in 
2010, Vinod moved into venture capitalism, where he continues to make healthy profits while 
living happily with his wife and four children. On the other end of the socioeconomic spectrum, 
Lata Patel and her husband, Pankaj, run a Budget Inn in Jasper, Georgia (Varadarajan 1999). 
Their motel is modest. Nestled in a town of fewer than 4,000 residents, the motel represents the 
Patels’ achievements in the United States - in their own words, their “American Dream.”  
 Vinod lives in California and the Patels live in Georgia. Vinod has earned enough money 
to comfortably last through his children’s lives, while the Patels continue to work and earn a 
livelihood. Despite the multitude of differences that distinguish Vinod and the Patels, 
surprisingly, they share more than just their Indian heritage. All three identify as Democrats. 
How could three people with vastly different life trajectories determine that they support the 
policies and priorities of the same political party? If Vinod and the Patels were white, then their 
distinct socioeconomic backgrounds might drive them to support opposing political parties. So 
why do they all identify as Democrats? 
The larger question of why Indian-Americans tend to coalesce under the Democratic 
Party is a puzzling one. Despite the fact that Indians only make up about 1% of the U.S. 
population, they are, on average, remarkably wealthy and well-educated (López, et al 2017). 
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However, at the same time, many members of the racial group hold low-wage jobs, earn very 
little, and have low income levels (Dhingra 2016).  In a population characterized by an unequal 
income and educational distribution, why do the majority of Indians identify as Democrats 
(Ramakrishnan, et al 2017)? 
I began this project by stumbling across Michael Dawson’s 1994 book, Behind the Mule: 
Race and Class in African-American Politics. In the book, Dawson argues that African-
Americans conceptualize their individual life chances as inextricably linked to the status of their 
entire racial group. The author then models a “Black Utility Heuristic” that African-Americans 
use to determine how they feel about policy issues and which candidates to vote for. According 
to Dawson, this Black Utility Heuristic drives African-Americans toward the Democratic Party.  
More broadly, in political science, researchers have closely tied group consciousness (a 
broader version of Dawson’s linked fate) to experiences of racial discrimination. Scholars have 
argued that experiences with discrimination might facilitate this group-based psychological 
connection (Masuoka 2006; Sanchez 2006; Austin, et al 2012). Additionally, ample research 
suggests that there is a link between group consciousness and party identification (Mangum 
2014; McDaniel 2018; Sanchez 2006; McClain, et al 2009; Masuoka 2006) and racial 
discrimination and party identification (Masuoka 2006; Mangum 2013; Austin, et al 2012; Stout 
and Garcia 2015; Sanchez 2006).  
The central question of this thesis is why Indian-Americans coalesce in their support for 
the Democratic Party. This project attempts to contribute to a small body of literature that seeks 
to describe and understand Indian-American political behavior.  
In order to do so, I develop a theory of Indian-American partisanship. In chapter 2, I 
examine already-existing theories of partisanship and highlight several reasons why they may not 
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be able to fully describe Indian-American partisanship acquisition. I then outline theories of 
partisanship acquisition as they relate to two predominantly-Democratic social groups, Jewish 
people and Asian-Americans. This background builds to an original theory of Indian-American 
party identification, which I present in the final section of the chapter. 
Chapter 3 features a content analysis conducted on newspaper articles from The New 
York Times and India Abroad to explore what newspaper coverage about Indian-Americans 
looks like. I first provide some background on how the media reinforces group consciousness to 
contextualize the analysis. I then outline the methodology of my content analysis - how I 
collected the articles, what exactly I looked for as I analyzed them, and how I analyzed them. 
Next, I analyze the articles themselves. Evaluating newspaper articles from The New York Times 
and India Abroad, I find that negative coverage on Indian-Americans in those two populations 
occurs sufficiently infrequently that the likelihood of newspapers reinforcing Indian-American 
group consciousness is low. I close by discussing other pathways by which group consciousness 
could be created. 
Chapter 4 considers the antecedents of Indian-Americans’ party identification. Here, I use 
the 2016 Comparative Multiracial Post-Election Survey (CMPS), which surveys 483 Indian-
Americans. I find that while experiences of racial discrimination do not drive Indian-Americans 
toward the Democratic Party, the perception of group consciousness amongst Indian-Americans 
does when controlling for the already-existing theories of partisanship that I outline in chapter 2. 
The fact that group consciousness drives Indian-Americans to support the Democratic party 
independently of other well-established theories of partisanship suggests that group 
consciousness acts distinctly from other  ways that political scientists had previously 
conceptualized partisanship acquisition. The empirical analysis tests whether the theory 
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advanced in chapter 2 is supported. Throughout my chapters of analysis, I maintain a discussion 
of how already-existing literature on partisanship acquisition and group consciousness explain 
my results. 
The final chapter of this project provides an overview of the ground that this thesis 
covers. I then explore several potential avenues of future research. In sum, this project sheds 
































In this chapter, I present a theory of Indian-American partisanship acquisition. First, I 
motivate my research by describing how most Indian-Americans identify as Democrats, even 
though we have ample reason to believe that they might be divided by partisanship. Second, I 
introduce three theories of party identification that may help us understand why Indian-
Americans support the Democratic Party. Then, I use these theories to explore partisanship 
acquisition for two other predominantly-Democratic communities, Jewish Americans and Asian-
Americans. After applying these theories of partisanship to these communities to understand the 
theories’ practical strengths and limitations, I present a specific theory of Asian-American and 
then Indian-American partisanship. Finally, I outline several hypotheses to test the theory of 
Indian-American partisanship.  
 
Motivation 
Indian-Americans are a diverse community. Expatriates left every corner of India to 
emigrate to the United States. They come from all parts of the socioeconomic spectrum; poor, 
middle class, and wealthy Indians emigrated from the country in pursuit of upward economic 
mobility. Hindus, Muslims, and members of other religious minorities chose to emigrate, further 
illustrating that there was no single “type” of person that was prone to move to the United States 
(Chandrasekhar 1986).  
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Within the United States, Indian-Americans still exhibit remarkable levels of 
heterogeneity. Most Indian-Americans live on the East Coast, but there are large population 
centers both in the Midwest and on the West Coast (Rodriguez-Gitler 2017). As of 2017, 17% of 
Indian-Americans were between the ages of 5 and 17, 18% were between the ages of 18 and 29, 
22% were between the ages of 30 and 39, 14% were between the ages of 40 and 49, and 13% 
were between the ages of 50 and 64 (Rodriguez-Gitler 2017). This means that the age 
distribution of Indians is roughly evenly distributed around the middle of the age spectrum, 
skewing slightly rightward. 32% of Indian-Americans are not in the labor force, while 65% are 
(Rodriguez-Gitler 2017).  Finally, income inequality in the Indian American community is 
extreme. The highest earning 10% of the group make an average of $133,500 annually, while the 
poorest 10% make an average of just below $12,500 (Rajan 2018). The average annual income 
of an Indian-American is $100,000, so the Indian-American income distribution is left-skewed, 
with most Indian-Americans concentrated on the high end of the group’s socioeconomic 
spectrum (López, et al 2017). 
 This diversity in location of origin, religion, socioeconomic status, age, and educational 
achievement suggest that in politics, Indian-Americans might identify with different parties. 
However, 68% of Indian-Americans are Democrats and only 16% are Republicans 
(Ramakrishnan, et al 2017). This high degree of cohesion is puzzling; in a population with so 
many internal cleavages, why are so many of its members drawn to a single party? Additionally, 





Theories of Party Identification 
 In this section, I outline four popular theories of party identification to help us understand 
how individuals adopt their partisanship. I begin by evaluating why partisanship is important to 
study before delving into an overview of each theory while paying special attention to their 
strengths and weaknesses.  
In American politics, research has found that partisanship is an important social 
categorization because people’s party identification can often determine vote choice (Meier 
1975). Similarly, understanding why people choose their partisanship gives researchers insight 
into their conception of the political and social landscape. For example, if people choose their 
party affiliation based upon the social groups with which they affiliate, this signals that in 
politics, individuals primarily conceptualize themselves in terms of those social groups. 
However, if people choose their party identification based upon how the parties’ policy stances 
impact their own lives, individuals implicitly conceptualize themselves as free agents acting 
autonomously.  
An individual may find her party identification useful for two reasons. First, the party 
label facilitates political participation by giving people a heuristic to determine their opinion, 
which saves many voters the time that they might otherwise need to determine which candidates 
to support (Abramson 1982; Finkel and Opp 1991). Second, most people are not ideologues; in 
the absence of party identification, their policy opinions do not align with a clear preference for 
big or small government (Converse 2000). Party identification, then, lends an individual a 
coherent set of policy opinions that bolsters their perceived level of political knowledge (Anson 
2018). When people have high levels of political knowledge, they are more likely to participate 
(Valentino, et al 2011).  
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Given its importance, many scholars have endeavored to study how people develop their 
party identification. I provide an overview of four theories of partisanship acquisition, moving 
chronologically from oldest to newest. These theories will provide the framework to evaluate 
existing theories of Jewish-American and Asian-American party identification before informing 
my original theory of Indian-American partisanship. 
I will begin with Anthony Downs. According to Downs, voters rationally weigh the 
benefits that they would accrue if a particular candidate were in office against the benefits that 
they would accrue if the opposing candidate were in office (Downs 1957). Voters then choose 
the candidate who increases their own well-being the most, either directly (by implementing 
impactful social programs that increase their quality of life, for example) or indirectly (by 
diverting resources toward other subpopulations that they support, like the poor) (Downs 1957).  
Focusing on American politics, Fiorina (1981) builds upon Downs’s work by positing an 
explanation for how Americans develop their party identification in the United States. Fiorina 
begins by claiming that party identification is unstable over time (87). Using data from the 1956-
58-60 SRC Panel Study, Fiorina demonstrates that while only 15% of respondents changed their 
party identification from one party to another, more than 40% of respondents changed their 
position on a seven-point scale of partisanship. Based upon this claim, Fiorina argues that an 
individual’s party identification is the result of a carefully-considered comparison of her 
experiences with the two parties modified by a scalar that takes into account other factors that 
might influence a person’s party identification, such as her parents’ partisanship (90). Implicit in 
Fiorina’s model is the notion that voters are capable of objectively weighing their own 
evaluations, which are assumed to be accurate, because they paid close attention to the parties’ 
actions during previous elections. 
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Fiorina’s model also assumes that people do not have strong group attachments that 
might influence their political decisions. In rationally tallying each party’s performance before 
each election, people are not shaped by their salient identities, which presumably remain stable 
over time in determining how they will allocate their vote. Instead, they focus on their own 
evaluations of the parties. This conceptualization of the acquisition of party identification lends 
itself to understanding political actors as atomistic. 
In his seminal piece “The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics” (1964), Philip 
Converse lays the foundation for the second theory of partisanship outlined in this paper. 
Converse notes that while most Americans have low levels of political knowledge, the variance 
of the political knowledge distribution is high. This means that while some Americans know next 
to nothing about politics, some possess lots of information on the subject. Furthermore, when 
Americans are asked their opinions on policy issues at two times, T1 and T2, they tend to give 
different answers at T1 and T2. However, when respondents have a party identification, they 
respond consistently at both T1 and T2 (44). Converse’s work reveals two things about 
partisanship. First, people use their party affiliation as a heuristic to determine their opinion on 
policy issues. Second, partisanship predicts how people feel on policy issues because they inherit 
those policy stances from their party identification. 
Building upon these findings, Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes (1960) argue that 
people are socialized to identify with a party in childhood and that they inherit their partisanship 
from their immediate surroundings, most notably from their parents. One’s attachment to a party 
is psychological, rather than rational; people do not continually reassess the parties’ stances on 
issues to arrive at a party identification. Rather, their partisan attachment endures throughout 
their lives. In contrast to Fiorina’s theory, Campbell, et al imply that party identification should 
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be relatively stable across time because after childhood,  people’s views tend to crystallize and 
once they inherit their partisanship, people do not engage in any rational decision-making 
calculus to shift it (Campbell, et al 1960).   
These theories of partisanship may be sufficient for Americans who have access to news 
sources to increase their political knowledge, as Downs and Fiorina presume, or live within a 
community from which they can inherit a party identification, as Campbell, et al presume. 
However, for those who lack these connections, there must be some other explanation for party 
identification. To this effect, Green, Palmquist, Schickler, and Mason offer a third theory of 
party identification that could apply to these communities. 
Green, Palmquist, and Schickler find that people do not evaluate each party’s stances on 
policy issues that are important to them and then make a final decision on which party to support 
based upon those evaluations. Rather, people hold stereotypes of the parties and they associate 
specific groups, like Evangelical Christians or African-Americans, with each party (Green, et al 
2002). People then choose a party to identify with by situating themselves according to how they 
feel as about the parties’ constituent groups (Green, et al 2002).  
This theory holds several implications. First, it means that people do not engage in 
Downs’s and Fiorina’s rational decision-making calculus to identify with a party. Second, it 
means that within politics, people conceptualize themselves as group members rather than as 
individual actors. This, in turn, implies that people also use their salient social identities to 
dictate how they donate money, protest, and volunteer. Third, it means that people who do not 
have access to traditional channels of partisanship acquisition can still acquire a party 
identification. As long as they hold a salient social identity and feelings toward the parties’ 
salient social groups, they can orient themselves politically. It is possible that, in doing so, 
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people may support a party with policy stances that do not benefit themselves personally. This is 
significant because it directly refutes Downs’s theory of utility assessments driving people to 
always vote in their best interest.  
Mason (2018) builds upon Green, Palmquist, and Schickler by reconciling their theory of 
party identification with social identity theory, which states that people derive self-esteem 
through their group affiliation. Mason argues that people affiliate themselves with groups that 
they hold in high esteem. Additionally, people maintain a consistent party affiliation over time 
because they engage in motivated reasoning - bending the truth so that an individual’s 
understanding of it fits with their own preconceived notions - to convince themselves that their 
party should be a high-esteem group, even if it is currently a low-esteem one (13-14).  Mason’s 
most relevant contribution to my thesis is the fact that people affiliate themselves with groups 
that they consider to be of high esteem. The question that follows, then, is why Indian-Americans 
consider the Democratic Party in such a light.  
Mason’s addition to Green and colleagues creates several new relevant implications. 
First, it suggests people understand how their social groups are positioned relative to one another 
because the theory presumes an understanding of high- and low-esteem groups. Second, it means 
people not only conceptualize politics in terms of how social groups interact, but they understand 
those groups to be important to their own identities. This is significant because it supports Green, 
and colleagues’ original assertion that people orient themselves politically according to their 
most socially salient identity.  
While Green, et al and Mason’s theory accounts for the political socialization of 
immigrants and of other people without the connections to accrue political knowledge or party 
identification, it has strengths and weaknesses in describing Indian-Americans’ partisanship 
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acquisition. One such strength is that it accounts for how members of a group new to the United 
States acquire their partisanship by suggesting that they orient themselves according to groups 
that they associate with independently of politics, like, in this case, a racial or ethnic group. 
Another strength is that the scholars present a group-centric theory, which validates the notion 
that Indian-Americans’ partisanship acquisition happens at the group level, rather than the 
individual level. Third, this theory comports with Converse’s findings on response instability. 
Stereotypes of the parties’ constituencies, the drive to maintain high self-esteem, and people’s 
party identification are all fairly consistent across time, regardless of how the political climate 
shifts (Converse 2000; Green, et al 2002). 
However, these theories of partisanship do not completely explain Indian-American party 
identification for a few reasons. First, most Indian-Americans are Democrats, even though there 
are several social cleavages within the community that could stratify their party identification. 
Second, Mason’s theory is predicated upon the assumption that social groups understand their 
own positioning relative to other groups’ partisanship affiliations. Third, Green and colleagues’ 
theory implies that groups are familiar with each party’s salient constituencies. However, in the 
case of groups that are either very new to the United States or very insular groups, this 
understanding may not exist.  
Stepping back, we see that the dominant theories of partisanship might not fully describe 
Indian-Americans’ party identification. According to Downs and Fiorina, because they are 
wealthy, we might expect Indian-Americans attempting to maximize their wealth. This would 
drive them to vote for Republicans, who advocate to reduce taxes and limit government 
interference in the economy (Francia, et al 2005; Rhodes and Schaffner 2017). However, there is 
little empirical evidence proving this to be the case (Ramakrishnan, et al 2017). On the other 
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hand, because they are relatively new to the United States, we do not know if Indian-Americans 
are familiar with each party’s salient constituencies, as Green, et al might expect, or if they 
derive positive self-esteem from the Democratic Party, as Mason suggests.  
Indian-Americans are not the only group that defies conventional wisdom on party 
identification. Before studying Indian-American partisanship, it would be helpful to examine two 
other groups that also hold counterintuitive party identifications. This will help determine how 
much the theories outlined above describe the electorate. I first address Jewish Americans and 
then Asian-Americans. 
 
Party Identification in the Jewish Community 
In 2014, 61% of the Jewish population identified as Democratic or leaned Democratic, 
while 31% of the demographic identified as Republican or leaned Republican (Smith 2015). This 
is surprising for three reasons. First, Jewish people are phenotypically white, so one might expect 
them to be stratified politically in a similar way to how the white population is politically 
stratified (i.e, people of higher socioeconomic status tend to identify as Republican, while people 
of low socioeconomic status tend to identify as Democrats) (Wormald 2015). Second, like 
Indian-Americans, the majority of Jewish people identify as Democrats regardless of their 
socioeconomic status, which isn’t necessarily true of other phenotypically-white subgroups 
(Wormald 2015). Third, Jewish people are, on average, very wealthy. 44% of Jewish Americans 
earn more than $100,000 annually (Masci 2016). To reconcile these apparent contradictions 
within Jewish people's’ political lives, it is important to understand the history of Jewish peoples’ 
party affiliation in the United States.  
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Jewish party identification in the twentieth century has shifted in reaction to changes in 
the country’s social and political environment. Historical survey data show that Jewish people 
initially aligned themselves with the Republican Party but, in 1928, shifted toward the FDR’s 
Democratic Party in droves (Gamm 1989). After Roosevelt’s death, Jewish support for the 
Democratic Party waned, but not considerably so; the group still overwhelmingly supported 
Democratic candidates over Republican ones (Lubell 1951). From the 1960s to the 1980s, Jewish 
support for the Democratic Party further decreased, but in 1992, Democratic support started 
trending upward (Mellman, et al 2012). Herbert F. Weisberg, professor emeritus of political 
science at The Ohio State University, contends that Pat Buchanan’s 1992 speech on the “culture 
war” helped to drive Jewish people away from the Republican Party and into the arms of the 
Democrats (2014).  
In the twenty-first century, Jewish people have consistently voted for Democratic 
candidates. In light of this data, the question of why Jewish people are Democrats still remains. 
Several theories may explain this choice of identification. First, as Downs might posit, a 
candidate’s stance on Israel may affect how receptive Jewish people are to that candidate. The 
Republican Jewish Coalition (RJC) deployed a survey to Jewish people nationwide that asked 
how important policy issues about Israel were in determining a person’s vote choice. 30% of 
respondents indicated that candidates’ stances on those issues were very important, 46% said 
they were somewhat important, and 22% said that they were not important (Weisberg 2014). The 
respondents who marked candidates’ stances on Israel as very important voted for then-Governor 
Romney in the 2012 presidential election more frequently than President Obama by an 8% 
margin (53% for Governor Romney, 45% for President Obama) (Weisberg 2014).1 Because 
                                                
1 While Governor Romney and President Obama both supported strengthening the US’s connection with Israel, 
Governor Romney made the issue more of priority during the election, going so far as to promise that if he were 
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Jewish people overwhelmingly identify as Democrats, at first glance, this small margin is 
surprising. However, we may attribute the size of this margin to the fact that it exists for the 
subgroup of Jewish Americans who claim to account for the candidates’ policy stances on Israel 
when determining their vote choice.  
These figures are especially notable when considering that this split in Jewish-
Americans’ vote choice was structured such that Governor Romney won more than 50% of its 
votes. As demonstrated above, between 2000 and 2012, Democratic presidential candidates won 
between 69% and 79% of the Jewish vote. Even though the 2012 election saw a decrease in the 
percentage of Jewish people that voted for the Democratic candidate, overall, almost 70% of the 
total group eventually voted for President Obama in the general election. The fact that Governor 
Romney won a sizeable subgroup of the Jewish population indicates that it may not be the 
parties’ stances on Israel that draw Jewish people toward the Democratic Party, which supports 
Fiorina and Downs.  
This holds several implications for partisanship acquisition in the Jewish community. 
First, this theory implies that Jewish people can accurately assess the parties’ policy stances to 
determine their partisanship. The notion that Jewish people do this comports with Downs and 
Fiorina while refuting Campbell, et al, Green, et al, and Mason. Furthermore, Converse’s finding 
that on the scale of levels of conceptualization, most people are group interest, conflicts with this 
theory of party identification (Converse 1964). Second, because a subset of Jewish people’s vote 
choice can be predicted by their opinions of the candidates’ stances on Israel, this theory implies 
that Jewish people may be single-issue voters.  
                                                
elected, his first international trip would be to Israel (“Republicans Talk Tough on Iran; Vie for Jewish Vote”; Kahl 
2012) 
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However, another survey deployed by J-Street, a liberal advocacy group, found that only 
10% of Jewish people list the parties’ policy stances on Israel as an important determination of 
their vote choice. Of that 10%, 50% eventually voted for Governor Romney and 50% eventually 
voted for President Obama (Weisberg 2014). This indicates that Israel may be less important of a 
policy issue to Jewish people than the RJC poll would imply. Furthermore, Weisberg’s theory 
assumes that people can accurately assess candidates’ policy views on Israel. However, even if 
Jewish people do care about candidates’ stances on policy issues relating to Israel, their 
assessments of those stances may be incorrect. Therefore, we cannot draw a causal link between 
candidates’ stances on Israel and Jewish people’s support for those candidates.  
A second theory explains that the Democratic Party values the separation between 
religion and government more than the Republican Party does. The history of Judaism in the 
United States sheds light onto why Jewish people hold this belief. Before the twentieth century, 
Jewish people generally accepted that religion and the state may exist hand-in-hand as long as 
Judaism received as much respect as Christianity (Steinfels 2000). However, when prominent 
Christians in the United States began a crusade to make the United States explicitly Christian by 
institutionalizing religious holidays, enshrining religious scripture on government buildings, and 
appealing to Christian morals and values in campaigns and government administrations, Jewish 
people instead aligned themselves with secular Americans (Steinfels 2000). Within Green, et al’s 
framework, Jewish people consider secular people to be part of the Democratic Party’s base and 





Party Identification in the Asian-American Community 
Turning from ethnicity to race, we examine the case of Asian-Americans to study the 
relationship between race and partisanship. Unlike Jewish people, Asian-Americans have been 
consistent in their party identification throughout their time in the United States since the 1960s, 
when many first arrived in the United States (Kuo, et al 2017). Additionally, Asian-Americans, 
an umbrella term referring to all of the East, Southeast, and South Asians that moved the United 
States and their descendents, exhibit similarly surprisingly cohesive party identification. As of 
2017, 65% of Asian-Americans either identify as Democrat or lean Democrat, while 27% either 
identify as Republican or lean Republican (Liu 2018). This is somewhat unexpected because 
Asian-American is a social construction that arbitrarily groups immigrants and immigrant 
families together based upon their continent of origin. Additionally, Asian-Americans are very 
wealthy. The average Asian-American makes $73,060, which, for the reasons described in the 
section on theories of partisanship, makes it surprising that Asian-Americans are predominantly 
Democratic (López, et al 2017). 
This level of cohesion is also surprising because socioeconomically, Asian-Americans 
are very diverse. The median annual income for an Indian-American is $100,000, while the 
median annual income for a Burmese-American is $36,000 (López, et al 2017). These vastly 
different economic circumstances may lead to different political opinions; we might expect 
wealthy Asian-American subgroups to identify with the Republican Party (as wealthy whites do) 
and poor subgroups to affiliate themselves with the Democratic Party (as poor whites do) 
(Wormald 2015). However, we see that the pan-Asian label holds salience in politics because 
Asian-Americans tend to identify with one particular party regardless of other demographic 
characteristics (Liu 2018).  
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Unlike Jewish people, Asian-Americans are relatively new to the United States. After 
beginning to settle in the US in the mid-nineteenth century, the Asian population (and the 
corresponding anti-Asian sentiment that whites felt) rapidly grew until 1924, when the 
Immigrant Act of 1924 almost completely prevented Asians from immigrating to the United 
States further (Kitano 1993). As a result of the Immigrant Act of 1924, the Asian-American 
population quickly became predominantly native-born (Paik, et al 2014). This is relevant because 
meant that over time, whites’ anti-Asian sentiment came to be based within Asian-Americans’ 
race, rather than their lack of social assimilation.  In contrast, during this same time period, 
Jewish people started to become racialized as white (Brodkin 2007). 
From 1924 to 1965, the US government instituted restrictive quotas on the basis of 
potential immigrants’ country of origin that limited the number of Asians that could move to the 
United States annually (Paik, et al 2014). Between these years, Jewish people were given access 
to government programs, like the GI Bill, that explicitly discriminated against African-
Americans (Brodkin 2007). This further racialized them as white. In 1965, the government 
sharply pivoted on immigration, passing the 1965 Immigration Act that lifted those quotas and 
allowed an influx of Asian-Americans to move to the United States (Reimers 1983). By then, 
Jewish people were widely considered to be white (Brodkin 2017). It is important to note that the 
government facilitated the inclusion of Jewish Americans into the White community through its 
policies, which illustrates its power to include certain groups within the notion of “American,” 
and, transitively, to socially, politically, and economically exclude certain groups.  
Transitioning from Asian-Americans’ history in the US to their partisanship in the 
present-day, Kuo, Malhotra, and Mo (2017) posit that Asian-Americans tend to identify as 
Democrats because members of the community individuals face exclusion from the social in-
24 
group (i.e, whites). Because Asian-Americans perceive the Republican Party to cater to white 
Americans who tend to perpetuate such exclusion, Asian-Americans are less likely to support the 
Republican Party (Kuo, et al 2016). This theory insinuates that Asian-Americans are driven 
toward the Democratic Party not because of any particular affinity that they have for its policies, 
but because they do not feel warm toward constituent social groups in the Republican Party. This 
is significant because it comports with the Green, Palmquist, and Schickler finding on the 
adaptation identification outlined above.  
The second implication is that the social exclusion of individual members of a group 
impacts collective political identity, even across socioeconomic status and country of origin. This 
is significant because it means that Asian-Americans feel socially excluded regardless of any 
potentially-mitigating dimensions to their identity that afford them privilege, like being wealthy 
or speaking English as a first language. This lends further credence to the notion that the label 
“Asian-American” is a socially and politically salient one, both for the in-group (Whites) and for 
the out-group (Asian-Americans).  
Individuals’ experiences impacting collective identity supports Green and colleagues’ 
theory of partisanship acquisition by bolstering the notion that individuals frame their political 
lives using salient social group membership. If party identification operates on the group level, 
then the group is the politically-relevant unit of analysis, not the individual. Second, if the label 
“Asian-American” is salient for Asian-Americans, then it is possible that Indians may identify 
with the Democratic Party because they identify as Asian-American rather than because they 
identify as Indian-American. 
The racialization of Asian-Americans and the incorporation of Jewish people into the 
White community illustrate the strength of Mason and Green and colleagues’ theory. Race is a 
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method of human classification commonly understood to be rooted in biology, so people classify 
themselves as members of a certain race and find those classifications salient (Feagin 1998). In 
contrast, ethnicity is primarily defined by a group’s cultural heritage and language of origin. 
Ethnicity is considered a more fluid method of human classification than race for two reasons. 
First, people can renounce their culture and stop speaking their language of origin relatively 
more easily than they can convince others to shift how they interpret a person’s skin color. 
Second, because racial classification most frequently rests upon an assessment of a person’s 
phenotype, the notion that race is biological socially entrenches a person’s classification as a 
member of a certain race (Appelbaum 2008). This does not happen within the framework of 
ethnicity. The fact that Mason and Green, et al describe both people who consider their 
membership in a racial group to be most salient and people who consider their membership in an 
ethnic group to be most salient is a testament to the strength of Mason and Green and colleagues’ 
theories.  
 
Party Identification in the Indian-American Community 
In this section, I flesh out a theory for Indian-American party identification, referencing 
the four broad theories outlined earlier in this chapter as a framework for my analysis. I conclude 
with an original theory of Indian-American partisanship and follow that with several hypotheses 
regarding such party identification acquisition.  
On one hand, we have evidence that Indian-Americans are socially and economically 
distinct from other Asian-American subgroups - on average, they earn more money and attain 
higher levels of education than any other Asian-American subgroup (López, et al 2017). On the 
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other, the label “Asian-American” is a socially salient one that may dominate Indian-Americans’ 
identification with other immigrant families that share their country of origin (Kuo, et al 2017).  
Indian-Americans’ split in partisanship is apparent within the Indian-American 
population as a whole and in the subset of Indian-Americans who hold political office. 68% of 
Indian-Americans self-identify as Democrats, while 16% self-identify as Republicans 
(Ramakrishnan, et al 2017). While a similar proportion of Asian-Americans consider themselves 
to be Democrats (65%), a larger proportion of Asian-Americans consider themselves to be 
Republicans (27%). These data suggest that most Indian-Americans coalesce into a single 
partisan identity. The majority of Indian-American politicians are also Democrats, the notable 
exceptions being Bobby Jindal and Nikki Haley (Tsukerman 2015). However, politicians like 
Ravi Bhalla, the mayor of Hoboken, New Jersey, and Ro Khanna, a Congressman from 
California who previously was the Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Department of Commerce, 
illustrate the broader trend of Indian-Americans identifying as Democrats. This consolidation of 
a single partisan identity is surprising because, as mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, 
the Indian-American community is very diverse. 
The Asian-American subgroups that most closely mirror the partisanship divide of the 
Indian-American population are Korean-Americans and Japanese-Americans (Ramakrishnan, et 
al 2017). 64% of Korean-Americans identify as Democrats, while 29% identify as Republicans 
(Ramakrishnan, et al 2017). Of the Japanese-American community, 69% identify as Democrats 
and 23% identify as Republicans (Ramakrishnan, et al 2017). In conjunction with the statistics 
on Indian-American party identification, there are two main takeaways from these figures. First, 
significantly fewer Indian-Americans identify as Republicans than Korean-Americans and 
Japanese-Americans (Ramakrishnan, et al 2017). This may be a result of whites, the racial 
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majority, treating Indian-Americans differently from Korean-Americans and Japanese-
Americans, which are two populations that are more phenotypically white than Indian-
Americans. This differential socialization between the Indian-American and Japanese- and 
Korean-American communities may result in the two groups socially positioning themselves 
distinctly. This would ultimately result in fewer Indian-Americans identifying as Republicans 
than Japanese- and Korean-Americans identifying as such. It is also possible that Koreans’ and 
Japanese people’s distinct migration histories may impact their differential treatment at the hands 
of Whites; many more Japanese and Korean people immigrated to the United States than Indians 
(Jeong and You 2008; Paik, et al 2014). The time Japanese- and Korean-Americans lived in the 
United States without Indian-Americans present may have allowed Japanese- and Korean-
Americans to assimilate more than Indian-Americans have been able to. 
Before delving into the origins of Indian-Americans’ party identification, a cursory 
history of their time in the United States may begin to shed light upon why this might be the 
case. After the 1965 Immigration Act, Indians immigrated to the United States in droves. In the 
year the law was passed, 582 Indians settled in the United States. Fourteen years later, in 1979, 
19,708 Indians left their home country to find a life in the US (Reimers 1983). This almost 
3500% increase was due to the drastic shift in how the law treated immigrants. After World War 
I, the vast majority Asians were barred from entering the United States due to the Immigration 
Act of 1924. The 1965 Immigration Act allowed Indians to move to the US much more easily 
than they could before its passage.  
The uptick in the immigration rate saw a diverse group of Indians settling in the country 
(Chandrasekhar 1986). There was no single predictor that would indicate that an individual 
would be prone to migrate. The Indians that came to the United States represented every state in 
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their home country, every major religion in India, and almost the entire socioeconomic spectrum. 
Settled in their new country, most individuals sent remittances back to their families and 
frequently sponsored their relatives to join them in the US. In the 1980s, there was a wave of 
computer engineers and information technology professionals who took advantage of a special 
type of visa that the US had started issuing to fortify its computer industry. In fact, the vast 
majority of Indians immigrating to the United States came in groups with at least one person on 
an H1B (working) visa, meaning that many Indians came to the United States in pursuit of 
economic mobility. However, because of ingrained sexism within Indian culture, many women 
became stay-at-home mothers. Similarly, because many elderly people did not speak English, 
they remained confined to their children’s homes. Women and the elderly subsequently lived 
detached from most of the rest of society, thus creating a pattern of social exclusion from White 
America among some subpopulations (Dhingra 2016). 
Evidence suggesting the degree to which Indian-Americans have assimilated to 
mainstream society is contradictory. One common measure of assimilation, whether members of 
a group speak English proficiently, indicates that Indian-Americans may be relatively well-
assimilated because 80% of the group is proficient in English, compared to 70% of Asian-
Americans (Rodriguez-Gitler 2017). However, this may be a legacy of Britain’s colonial 
presence in India; many Indians grow up either speaking English or learning the language in 
school, so this high level of English proficiency in the Indian-American population does not 
necessarily indicate assimilation (Raval, et al 2016). Another common measure, intermarriage 
rates, suggests the opposite. Of all Asian-Americans, Indian-Americans intermarry with 
members of other races the least frequently (Kalmjin and Van Tubergen 2010). Globally, South 
Asian-Americans have the lowest intermarriage rates with Whites, with 1.72% of South Asian-
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Americans marrying a US-born White spouse. In comparison, 10.75% of East Asian-Americans 
and 15.71% of Southeast Asian-Americans marry US-born White spouses (Boha Mishra and 
Massey 2014). Within the South Asian-American community, Indian-Americans are the least 
likely subgroup to intermarry. 14.3% of Indian-Americans marry people of non-Indian origin, 
while 23.5% of Pakistani-Americans marry people of non-Pakistani origin (Kalmjin and Van 
Tubergen 2010). A third metric, the fraction of the population that has lived in the United States 
for ten years, comports with the intermarriage data: one in three Indian-Americans moved to the 
United States less than ten years ago (DeSilver 2014). These data indicate that Indian-Americans 
may be poorly-assimilated.  
Moving into politics, existing scholarship sheds very little light on how exactly Indian-
Americans inherit their partisanship, or, more broadly, the political behavior of Indian-
Americans. The most relevant piece of work, Sangay Mishra’s book Desis Divided, explores 
how several cleavages within the South Asian population in the United States drive the group 
apart despite their seemingly-strong co-ethnic ties (2016). He specifically draws from Cristina 
Beltrán, who studies Latino political cohesion, to outline a framework that implies that the term 
“South Asian” indiscriminately describes anyone who finds their origins within South Asia, 
regardless of their length of residence in the United States, country of origin, level of educational 
attainment, wealth, or any other piece of information that may be used to stratify the group 
(Mishra 2016). The generality of the term obscures distinctions within the community and, as a 
result, those distinctions do not manifest politically. Mishra’s own framework posits that an 
individual’s ethnoracial identity interacts with other identities within the South Asian population, 
like religion or country of origin, to impact the trajectory of political mobilization for that 
person’s ethnoracial group (Mishra 2016). However, he does not study partisanship within the 
30 
Indian-American community. Mapping onto party identification, though, Mishra’s theory might 
suggest that Indian-Americans’ partisanship should not be cohesive because the partisan makeup 
of the Indian-American community should reflect its diversity.  
With this context, I develop my own theory for the acquisition of Indian-Americans’ 
partisanship. I posit that group consciousness forged by discriminatory treatment conditions 
Indian-Americans to hold consistent evaluations of white Americans (Masuoka and Junn 2013). 
Furthermore, the combination of Indian-Americans’ relatively high income and their relatively 
dark phenotype distinguishes them from other Asian-Americans such that “Indian-American” is 
a more socially salient term than “Asian-American” is (Shroff, et al 2017). Using these 
evaluations, Indian-Americans act in accordance to Green and colleagues’ theory of partisanship 
acquisition; they choose a party identification according to how warmly or coldly they feel 
toward the parties’ constituent groups.  
An Indian-American group consciousness arises out of two mutually-reinforcing 
conditions. First, Indian-Americans believe that Whites discriminate against them. The second 
condition that reinforces an Indian-American group consciousness is several characteristics that 
bind Indian-Americans, such as country of origin, religion (and, more specifically, not being 
Christian), and low intermarriage rates (Kalmjin and Van Tubergen 2010). The combination of 
these two conditions facilitates an Indian-American group consciousness separate from the 












 The purpose of this chapter is to explore news media coverage of Indian-Americans. 
Specifically, I am interested in whether featuring stories of racial discrimination may cultivate 
group consciousness among Indian-Americans that could eventually facilitate Democratic 
partisanship. The preceding chapter presents a theory for why Indian-Americans coalesce under 
the Democratic Party. This theory outlines how the news media’s profiles of racial 
discrimination against Indian-Americans might create group consciousness akin to linked fate 
among Indian-Americans. This chapter uses content analysis of articles from The New York 
Times and India Abroad employing natural language processing software to learn more about 
how the media publicizes Indian-Americans’ experiences of racial discrimination.  
 Building on the previous chapter’s theory, I begin this chapter by examining previous 
scholarship examines the relationship between group consciousness and the media. Afterwards, I 
present the methodology of my content analysis and my results. The data from this content 
analysis indicate that the media covers instances of anti-Indian-American discrimination 
infrequently, even when the media source is an ethnic newspaper specifically geared toward the 
expatriate Indian-American community. This coverage is sufficiently infrequent that it is 
unlikely that the media actually reinforce an Indian-American group consciousness by 
amplifying instances of racial discrimination against Indian-Americans. I conclude this chapter 





 Research in political science has demonstrated that an individual’s experiences of 
discrimination drive her to draw closer to her co-ethnics and form group consciousness, which 
has been defined as the prevailing understanding that a person’s individual life chances are 
inextricably linked to the status of their entire racial group (Masuoka and Junn 2013; McClain, et 
al 2009). I suggest that Indian-Americans use this group consciousness to make political 
decisions, like their party identification, by determining how to orient themselves within the 
political landscape to maximize their racial group’s overall utility. For this reason, they align 
themselves with the Democratic Party.   
 Several scholars demonstrate how the news media can reinforce a racially-based group 
consciousness. Ostfeld (2017) finds that Spanish-language political advertisements promote a 
pan-Latino group consciousness and strengthen the perception of Latinos’ collective political 
power. Kerevel (2011) writes that spanish-language media reinforces a Latino group 
consciousness by reminding Latinos of their shared Latin American cultural roots. Masuoka 
(2006) replicates these results within the Latino community and tentatively extends them to the 
Asian-American community, as well. In sum, the relationship between the news media and a 
racially-based group consciousness is a strong one, as the renders individuals’ racial identities 
salient and may drive individuals to band together with their co-ethnics.  
   
Methodology 
 To conduct this content analysis, I first identified two news sources that I wanted to 
analyze: The New York Times and India Abroad. I chose The New York Times for two reasons. 
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First, the publication is well-reputed and enjoys a daily circulation of almost 572,000 (FEC 
Filing). The fact that so many people read the publication indicates that it could reinforce 
discrimination that Indian-Americans face by publicizing those acts of discrimination so that 
Indian-Americans across the country learn about them.  The second reason that I chose to study 
articles from The New York Times is that the newspaper publishes an API, which is a tool that 
researchers can use to quickly download all of the articles that the organization publishes that 
match search terms that a researcher inputs. My use of the NYT API simplified the data 
collection process and allowed me to devote more of my time to analysis that I otherwise would 
have been able to if the API did not exist.  
I chose to also analyze India Abroad in this content analysis for two reasons. First, it is 
published in New York City and is run by Indian expatriates, which means that its content is 
more likely to reflect the views of the expatriate community than if it were run by non-Indians or 
Indians living in India. Second, India Abroad issues more than fifty thousand subscriptions and 
enjoys a readership of two hundred thousand, which, for an ethnic newspaper, is a tremendous 
reach (Rangaswamy 2008). The fact that so many people read the newspaper means that people 
trust its reporting. Additionally, Garrett and Stroud (2014) find that people seek out media 
sources that echo their pre-existing political beliefs. Therefore, it is safe to assume that the vast 
majority of Indian-Americans that consume material from India Abroad hold political beliefs 
that are in line with what the newspaper publishes. This is important for my research because it 
means that I can use the publication as a tool to determine which political attitudes Indian-
Americans hold. This shows that Indian expatriates feel as though the articles that India Abroad 
publishes are relevant to their own lives or otherwise resonate with them. 
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To analyze these sources, I first collected all of the URLs and articles that were relevant 
to my research. To collect the NYT articles that I would use for my analysis, I used the New 
York Times API and R, a software primarily used to conduct statistical analyses, to compile a list 
of all of the digitized New York Times articles that contain the term “Indian-American” that 
were published after 1978. Asian-Americans only started to coalesce under the Democratic Party 
in the 1990s, so I made no effort to pull articles that were published in the newspaper before 
1978 (Kuo, et al 2017). When testing which search term to use to yield the most accurate list of 
articles, I tried variations of the term (such as “Indian American” or “Indian”), but I found that 
every article that mentioned the racial subgroup contained “Indian-American” in that form. I then 
manually removed any extraneous articles that contained “Indian-American” but were irrelevant 
to this analysis. Examples of those kinds of articles include profiles of the Cleveland Indians (a 
professional baseball team) and stories that covered American Indians (also known as Native 
Americans).  
To collect the India Abroad articles for my analysis, I created a harvester that combed 
through the newspaper’s website and copied each URL and article and added it to the same csv 
file that the R code I had written to collect NYT articles used to deposit the NYT articles’ 
information. It is important to note that one key assumption that I made was that every article on 
the website mentioned or otherwise involved Indian-Americans in some way. I made this 
assumption because India Abroad explicitly gears its content toward the Indian-American 
community, so the newspaper’s publishers have decided that all of the content that the 
publication profiles is relevant to the Indian-American community. I was able to collect all of the 
articles that the newspaper published between September of 2017 and March of 2019. I was 
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unable to access articles that were published before September of 2017 because the newspaper 
does not keep an online archive.  
After running all of this code, I had one master csv file that listed all of the relevant NYT 
and India Abroad articles that I would use for my analysis. It included 679 New York Times 
articles and 495 India Abroad articles in total.  
I then uploaded a list of article contents to Google’s Natural Language API. Using that 
API’s sentiment analysis function, I checked the sentiment of each article and classified it as 
positive, neutral, or negative for the purposes of this analysis. Positive articles characterize the 
subject of the article in terms that emphasize the subject’s good or desirable qualities or actions. 
An example of a positive article from this dataset is a rave review of an Indian restaurant in 
Brooklyn run by an immigrant couple and their children. Negative articles characterize their 
subjects in unfavorable terms. An example of a negative article from the dataset is an article that 
criticizes Ajit Pai, the FCC Chairman, when he spoke out against net neutrality. Neutral articles 
contain a balance of positive and negative sentiment, as defined by the article’s characterization 
of its main subject. and negative articles referred to Indian-Americans in a negative light. An 
example of such an article is one that mentions that Edison, New Jersey has a large Indian-
American population without attaching any value judgements to that assessment. I also compiled 
a list of keywords motivated by the theory that I outlined in chapter 2 and wrote Python script to 
determine how frequently each word appeared within the subset of articles that mention Indian-
Americans. This keyword bank should give us insight into how frequently these newspapers 





 In this section, I first present my analysis of New York Times articles published after 1978 
that mention Indian-Americans. After, I present my analysis of the India Abroad articles. 
The first trend that I looked for was the frequency at which The New York Times 
published articles that mentioned Indian-Americans. Because I pulled every India Abroad article 
that I could find, I could not evaluate this trend since I would instead be evaluating the frequency 
at which the newspaper publishes articles, which is unrelated to the topic of this thesis. However, 
I could plot the frequency at which The New York Times published articles about Indian-




As the graph shows, The New York Times has steadily published more and more articles 
that mention Indian-Americans over the last forty years. While there are dips and spiked in the 
number of articles that mention Indian-Americans, the trend is unequivocally in the positive 
direction. This supports my first expectation, which is that over time, as the number of Indian-
Americans grows, the amount of news coverage on Indian-Americans should also grow.  
Next, I evaluate trends in positive, negative, and neutral articles on Indian-Americans that 
were published in The New York Times. According to my theory, I expect the number of negative 
articles that mention Indian-Americans to increase over time. I hold no expectations for the 
frequency of neutral and positive articles over time. I present those trends below. 
Figure 3.2 
 
 Unsurprisingly, most of the articles are neutral. This makes sense because most of the 
articles that mention Indian-Americans do not focus on the racial group, but rather mention it 
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off-handedly. For example, several articles profile the demographics of a particular city and 
mention sizeable Indian-American populations. Another notable feature of this graph is that it 
shows that there was more positive coverage about Indian-Americans than negative coverage. 
This may be because The New York Times published stories that profiled specific Indian-
Americans’ achievements, like Kalpana Chawla and Nikki Haley, more frequently than stories 
about Indian-Americans in general or about non-famous Indian-Americans who were the target 
of discrimination or hate crimes.  
 The final part of my content analysis with The New York Times articles on Indian-
Americans analyzed the frequency of a list of words that I came up with by considering my 
theory and recurring themes that popped up in the articles. I present a graph of the frequency of 
those words below.  
The keyword bank includes “bribe,” “stolen,” “theft,” “assault,” “kill,” “murder,” 
“discriminated,” and “discriminatory” because of their obvious negative connotations. “White” 
was also a keyword because many articles profiled a white perpetrator that committed a 
discriminatory action or hate crime against an Indian-American. Finally, I included “Dotbuster” 
because the Dotbusters were a group that committed hate crimes against Indian-Americans in the 









As this graph indicates, all of the keywords that I tested for increased in frequency over 
time. However, even though the trend is pronounced, the scope of these results renders their 
impact on an Indian-American group consciousness insignificant. I analyzed 679 New York 
Times articles, but in comparison to the hundreds of thousands of articles that The New York 
Times has published since 1978, the newspaper has published so few articles that mention 
Indian-Americans that their effect on Indian-Americans’ relationships with their co-ethnics must 
be negligible. This means that if an Indian-American group consciousness exists, some 
alternative mechanism must facilitate its existence. The results of The New York Times analysis 
must also either understate the Indian-American group consciousness, since there are a plethora 
40 
of alternative mechanisms that could facilitate the group consciousness that this content analysis 
cannot evaluate.  
Another publication, India Abroad, explicitly orients itself toward the Indian-American 
expatriate population. Because of this, I assume that every article that the newspaper publishes is 
relevant to Indian-Americans. Therefore, I cannot produce a graph that details trends in the 
newspaper’s coverage on Indian-Americans over time. However, I can create a graph that details 




As the graph above indicates, there is a spike in negative articles around September of 
2018. Because this graph only spans 21 months, I cannot make any claims about long-term 
trends in India Abroad’s coverage. However, this spike’s size is certainly notable, even though 
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there are not any events that happened in September of 2018 that can explain its existence. To 
take a more nuanced look at India Abroad’s coverage, I evaluate it in relation to the same 




 Interestingly, in the India Abroad articles, only “stolen,” “theft,” “discrimination,” 
“discriminator,” and “white” appear. Again, because the articles that contain those keywords 
only represent coverage from May of 2018 to March of 2018, I cannot draw any larger 
conclusions about this coverage. However, again, it is interesting to note the substantial spike in 
the number of times “white” is mentioned. That being said, because the entirety of India Abroad 
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is geared toward Indian-Americans, the word “white” may be used outside of the context of 
identifying someone who discriminated against an Indian-American. 
 
Conclusion 
 In conclusion, the results of this content analysis are inconclusive. Because The New York 
Times has published so few articles on Indian-Americans, it is very unlikely that their coverage 
reinforces an Indian-American group consciousness. Additionally, because I only analyze India 
Abroad articles from a relatively short period of time, I cannot draw any conclusions from trends 
in that coverage. In the future, to complement this analysis, I would conduct a broader content 
analysis that examines how other forms of the news media cover Indian-Americans. 
While I set out to examine how media coverage on Indian-Americans portrays members 
of the racial group, I found that the newspapers that I profiled are unlikely to reinforce an Indian-
American group consciousness. However, there are several reasons why this might be the case. 
First, in the case of my analysis if India Abroad, I was only able to analyze  21 months’ worth of 
articles. If I were able to access articles that the newspaper published over a longer period of 
time, then I might be able to draw a more substantive conclusion on the role of India Abroad in 
facilitating group consciousness. It might also be the case that Indian-Americans turn to other 
mechanisms of information dissemination, like religious institutions, community events, or 
informal social networks, for their news. I explain how these alternative mechanisms could 
function below.  
Religious institutions could reinforce an Indian-American group consciousness by 
grounding Indian-Americans in a community of like-minded Indian-Americans, which increases 
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the likelihood that Indian-Americans forge bonds with their co-ethnics. Within the black 
community, McDaniel (2018) describes a similar process in which black churches allow African-
Americans to congregate and advocate for a common belief system. These interactions at church 
build a foundation upon which blacks befriend one another and come to connect their personal 
life outcomes with their racial group’s status. In another example of religious institutions 
facilitating group consciousness, Jamal (2005) explains that Muslims who live and pray amongst 
other Muslims tend to prioritize the Muslim community’s welfare when casting their ballots on 
voting day. In the case of Indian-Americans, Hindus might come to prioritize their racial identity 
if the act of attending temple makes their racial identity salient. This might also work for non-
Hindu Indian-Americans; if religious institutions emphasize and celebrate their members’ 
cultural connections to their homeland, gurudwaras, mosques, and temples could maintain the 
relationship between an individual and her racial identity through reminding the individual of her 
homeland.  
Informal social networks could also facilitate an Indian-American group consciousness. 
These social networks may be attached to religious groups, like McDaniel (2018), Jamal (2005), 
and Ocampo, et al (2018) describe, or they can be secular in nature (Sanchez 2008). Informal 
social networks facilitate group consciousness in a similar manner to how religious spaces would 
do so. By forging bonds with their co-ethnics, Indian-Americans may come to see the well-being 
of the entire racial group as intertwined with their own individual well-being.  
Indian-American-centric community events could also facilitate an Indian-American 
group consciousness by introducing Indian-Americans to one another in a setting that 
emphasizes their shared racial identity. Austin, et al (2012) and Valenzuela and Michelson 
(2016) find that in the African-American and Latino communities, respectively, community 
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events that bring together co-ethnics may reinforce those co-ethnics’ bonds with one another and 
make their racial identities more salient. This drives them to connect their racial groups’ status to 











































The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the influence of experiences of 
discrimination on Indian-American partisanship, specifically as it operates through through an 
Indian-American group consciousness. The preceding chapter provides a content analysis that 
profiles instances of the New York Times and India Abroad covering anti-Indian discrimination; 
this chapter utilizes statistical techniques to determine how Indian-Americans’ experiences of 
discrimination impact their partisanship. I do this by running a series of regressions exploring the 
relationship between experiences of discrimination and partisanship identification using the 2016 
Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey (CMPS). I then test the validity of these results 
by including controls for already-existing explanations for partisanship acquisition. 
I begin this chapter by developing a set of theoretical expectations about the relationship 
between experiences of discrimination and partisanship identification derived from the theory 
presented in chapter 2. Additionally, I attempt to explain why the relationship that I outline is 
mediated by the existence of group consciousness by arguing that experiences of discrimination 
cause Indian-Americans to draw closer to their co-ethnics. The existence of an Indian-American 
group consciousness as an independent variable leads to several expectations for my analysis, 
which I then explain.  
The bulk of the analysis in this chapter makes use of national survey data to examine the 
relationship between Indian-Americans’ experiences of discrimination and Indian-Americans’ 
partisanship. I conclude this chapter by evaluating my original theory of Indian-American 
partisanship acquisition in relation to the already-existing theories that I profiled in chapter 2. I 
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find that while experiences of racial discrimination do not appear to facilitate group 
consciousness, group consciousness does impact Indian-Americans’ party identification 
distinctly from the other theories of party identification that I outline in chapter 2.  
 
Theory 
As I argue in Chapter 2, experiences of discrimination can draw members of a racial 
minority together. Experiencing racial discrimination makes an individual’s racial identity more 
salient, so she is more likely to draw close with other individuals who share that aspect of her 
identity - her race. I argue that this group consciousness may drive Indian-Americans to hold 
some beliefs on behalf of their racial group, rather than on behalf of themselves individually. 
Additionally, group consciousness drives Indian-Americans toward the Democratic Party 
because they want to align themselves in opposition to the social group that they perceive to 
discriminate against themselves. Indians associate that social group, whites, with the Republican 
Party.  
Although there is already literature that explores the partisanship and Asian Americans 
generally,  I suggest that there is a distinct relationships between Indian-Americans and 
partisanship. In part, this is because of some of the group’s distinct attributes: they have a 
relatively high average annual income compared to the average Asian-American, they are 
relatively dark phenotypically, they attain relatively high levels of education, they have a 
relatively low intermarriage rate with whites, and the majority of them are non-Christian (López, 
et al 2017; Kalmjin and Van Tubergen 2010). Together, I argue that these five factors distinguish 
Indian-Americans from Asian-Americans effectively enough that their partisanship acquisition 
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process ought to be distinct from the general partisanship acquisition process that other Asian-
American subgroups undergo.  
I argue that an Indian-American group consciousness arises out of two mutually-
reinforcing conditions. First, many Indian-Americans have experienced racial discrimination. 
The second condition that reinforces an Indian-American group consciousness is that, as 
aforementioned, there are several characteristics that distinguish Indian-Americans from other 
Asian-American subgroups, such as country of origin, religion (and, more specifically, not being 
Christian), and low intermarriage rates (which suggest relatively low levels of assimilation) 
(Kalmjin and Van Tubergen 2010). These two conditions ought to facilitate an Indian-American 
group consciousness separate from the Asian-American group consciousness. In turn, I expect 
Indian-American group consciousness to map onto support for the Democratic party. 
 
Expectations 
 In this section, I lay out my expectations for the empirical analysis. First, I expect to 
observe a significant relationship between experiences of discrimination and an Indian-American 
group consciousness because experiences of discrimination have been found to impact group 
consciousness, which, in turn, may lead Indian-Americans to identify as Democrats (Masuoka 
and Junn 2013). Second, I expect group consciousness to create a uniform set of standards that 
Indian-Americans use to evaluate social groups in the United States. Indian-Americans should 
adopt a party identification that accounts for those evaluations. I expect Indian-Americans to 
follow Green and colleagues’ theory of partisanship acquisition, whereby individuals assess 
which social groups they associate with each political party and orient themselves according to 
that assessment (2002).  
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To test this theory, I present two sets of analyses. First, I test whether Indian-Americans’ 
experiences of racial discrimination facilitate group consciousness among the racial group. 
Second, I test whether perceptions of an Indian-American group consciousness map onto Indian-
Americans’ support for the Democratic Party. To separate the impact of group consciousness 
from other already-existing theories of partisanship acquisition, I build in a set of controls for 
Green and colleagues’, Downs’s, and Fiorina’s theories. I do not implement a control for 
Converse’s theory of partisanship acquisition because the 2016 CMPS does not ask respondents 
about their parents’ party identifications.  
 Both sets of analyses that I present are multivariate regression models that use questions 
regarding Indian-Americans’ interactions with whites, Indian-Americans’ relationships with their 
co-ethnics, and Indian-Americans’ media consumption habits.  
 In sum, the analysis in this chapter evaluates the relationship between Indian-Americans’ 
experiences of discrimination and Indian-Americans’ partisanship identification. Determining 
why Indian-Americans tend to identify with the Democratic Party should shed light on the ties to 
the party that they maintain despite their relatively high average income. Furthermore, between 
2000 and 2015, the population grew by almost 210% (López, et al 2017). Studying the political 
behavior of a racial group that is growing so rapidly is important because it allows political 
scientists to track how the United States’s demographic changes will impact the larger political 
landscape.  
 
Data and Measurement 
The CMPS is national survey administered every four years online to a random sample of 
voters and non-voters by a team of scholars based out of UCLA. The 2016 CMPS was 
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administered between December 2016 and January 2017 and contained 483 respondents of 
Indian origin. Of those respondents, there are 63 Republicans, 227 Democrats, 165 Independents, 
and 28 respondents who support third parties. I present a table of descriptive statistics for the 
sample below. 
 





In each battery of regressions that I present in this chapter, after the initial bivariate 
model, I include a set of controls for racial makeup of the respondent’s neighborhood, 
respondent’s income, whether the respondent is first-generation, the respondent’s gender, and the 
respondent’s education level. I justify my inclusion of these controls in my models below. 
Racially-based residential segregation’s relationship with partisanship is a well-
documented phenomenon within political science (Sussell 2013; Boustan 2013; Rocha and 
Espino 2009; Burch 2014).  Most relevantly for this context, Sussell (2013) writes a correlation 
exists between the partisan makeup of a neighborhood and the fraction of the neighborhood that 
is white. Whiter neighborhoods are more likely to be predominantly Republican, while more 
diverse neighborhoods are more likely to be predominantly Democratic.  
Income, gender, education level, and status as a first-generation American are all 
correlated with a person’s partisanship. In general, people with higher incomes are more likely to 
identify as Republican, while people with lower incomes are more likely to identify as Democrat 
(Peterson 2016). I also implement a control for gender because women are more likely to 
identify with the Democratic Party than men are (Blinder and Rolfe 2018; Winter 2010). 
Additionally, people with higher levels of education are more likely to align with the Democratic 
Party than people with lower education levels (“Trends in Party Affiliation Among Demographic 
Groups”). Finally, scholarship indicates that a person’s status as a first-generation American 
impacts political attitudes, with first-generation Americans more likely to identify with the 





Experiences of Discrimination and Group Consciousness 
 Within the field of political psychology, experiences of discrimination have been well-
documented to induce group consciousness broadly (Masuoka and Junn 2007), within the Latino 
community (Sanchez 2006; Sanchez 2008; Schildkraut 2005; Wallace 2014; Masuoka 2006), 
within the African-American community (Dawson 1994; Austin, et al 2012), and, most 
relevantly for this thesis, within the pan-Asian community (Masuoka 2006).  
According to my theory, I expect to find that for Indian-Americans, experiences of racial 
discrimination induce group consciousness. To test this, I examine Indian-Americans’ responses 
to a question in the CMPS that asks whether respondents had ever experienced racial 
discrimination and use it as my independent variable. Respondents who had experienced racial 
discrimination were coded as 1, while respondents who had not experienced racial discrimination 
were coded as 0.  For my dependent variable, I consult Indian-Americans’ responses to a 
question about how much they feel as though what happens to Indian-Americans generally will 
impact their own lives. This question should tap into respondents’ perceptions of the existence of 
group consciousness because I define group consciousness as the belief that an individual’s 









Figure 4.2: A Regression of Group Consciousness on Racial Discrimination 
 
 While there initially appears to be a weak relationship between the two variables, once 
the model incorporates a set of demographic controls, the relationship fails to meet traditional 
standards of statistical significance. This does not comport with my original theory. However, it 
is possible that general experiences of discrimination within the Indian-American community 
could facilitate one.  
There are 483 Indians in the sample and 167 of them reported experiencing racial 
discrimination, which means that 316, or 65% of the sample, had not experienced that kind of 
discrimination. In contrast, every Indian-American respondent reported experiencing some kind 
of discrimination.2 Because a minority of Indian-American respondents had experienced racial 
discrimination that only other Indian-Americans would face, it is possible that racial 
                                                
2 Examples of non-racially-based discrimination include gender discrimination and discrimination based upon 
sexual orientation. 
53 
discrimination impacts sufficiently few Indian-Americans that it would not be able to induce 
group consciousness, even though in other racial groups within the United States, experiences of 
racial discrimination have been able to induce one. However, because every Indian-American in 
the sample had experienced some form of discrimination, it may be the case that general 
experiences of discrimination may drive Indians to band together through making the 
characteristics that distinguish them from the in-group (whites) salient. To test whether this is the 
case, I present a second set of regression results below.  
 
Figure 4.3: A Regression of Group Consciousness on General Experiences of Discrimination 
 
 Even when accounting for the different types of discrimination that an individual may 
face, once the model incorporates demographic controls, it appears as though there is no 
significant relationship between experiences of discrimination and group consciousness. There 
are several reasons why this might be the case. First, it is possible that the experiences of 
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discrimination that the CMPS respondents reported did not impact how closely Indian-
Americans feel with other members of their racial group. This is because other forms of 
discrimination, like gender discrimination or discrimination based upon being an immigrant, are 
not unique to the Indian-American population like racial discrimination on the basis of being of 
Indian origin is.  
The fact that every Indian-American in the sample had experienced discrimination is 
striking, but it may be the case that some instances of discrimination were the result of other 
aspects of the respondents’ identities. These instances of discrimination would fail to foster a 
racially-based group consciousness. Alternatively, it could be the case that Indian-Americans did 
experience racial discrimination, but misclassified it as something else when they were going 
through the experience. Finally, it could be the case that the CMPS asking Indian-Americans 
about their experiences of discrimination rendered some experiences that may not have actually 
been discrimination, but resembled it, salient. 
Despite these results, about half (233) of the Indian-Americans surveyed in the CMPS 
indicate that they believe that what happens to other Indian-Americans will personally impact 
their own lives. Therefore, even though experiences of racial discrimination do not necessarily 
facilitate group consciousness among Indian-Americans, it is possible that some other social 
phenomenon does, and that the group consciousness still exists. Extending further, it may still be 
the case that an Indian-American group consciousness impacts Indian-Americans’ partisanship. I 





Group Consciousness and Party Identification 
 While there exists some literature that links group consciousness and partisanship 
amongst racial groups, most literature on the relationship between the two focuses on how group 
consciousness acts as a heuristic for group members to make their political decisions (Sanchez 
2006; Sanchez 2008; McClain, et al 2009; Masuoka 2006; Stokes 2003).  
 According to my theory, I expect to find that an Indian-American group consciousness 
drives Indian-Americans to support the Democratic Party. Even though the data from the 
previous subsection of this chapter indicate that experiences of racial discrimination may not 
facilitate an Indian-American group consciousness, I expect that an Indian-American group 
consciousness should still drive Indian-Americans coalesce under a particular party because the 
group consciousness should give Indian-Americans a uniform set of standards to use to assess 
different social groups. I expect this to happen because a racially-based group consciousness may 
arise out of any activity that makes an individual’s racial identity salient (McClain, et al 2009). 
That means that there are a multitude of mechanisms that may facilitate group consciousness that 
I do not have the time to assess in this thesis.  
 To test this theory, I present a multiple ordinary least squares regression of partisanship 
on group consciousness. I constructed a partisanship variable from two questions in the CMPS. 
The first question asked respondents to provide their party identification. The second question 
asked respondents about how strongly they supported the political party that they had identified 
in the previous question. The scale is coded from 0 to 1, with lower values indicating a stronger 
preference for the Democratic Party (0) and higher values coded as a stronger preference for the 
Republican Party (1). To determine group consciousness, I consult responses from a question 
that asks whether respondents believe that what happens to Indian-Americans generally will 
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impact the respondents’ lives personally. To keep my measure of group consciousness consistent 
across all of my regressions, I use the same group consciousness question from my previous 
regression. Lower values indicate a stronger group consciousness, while higher values indicate a 
higher group consciousness.  I present the results of this analysis below.  
 
Figure 4.4: A Regression of Partisanship on Group Consciousness 
 
 
As the regression output above demonstrates, group consciousness does not appear to 
impact Indian-Americans’ preference for the Democratic Party. Initially, this is puzzling; why 
does this relationship not exist for Indian-Americans, even though in my brief review of the 
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relevant literature above, so many other racial groups use group consciousness to make political 
decisions, like party identification?  
To be sure of my results, as an additional check, I regress Indian-Americans’ assessments 
of Bill Clinton, a prominent Democratic politician, on perceptions of an Indian-American group 
consciousness. Respondents’ answers were coded such that lower values correspond to more 
favorable assessments, while higher values indicate more negative assessments.  I maintain the 
direction in which these answers were coded to remain consistent with the regressions from the 
previous section, which were also coded in this way. The results are below. 
 
Figure 4.5: A Regression of Assessments of Bill Clinton on Group Consciousness 
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 As we can see, when we test how an Indian-American group consciousness impacts 
Indian-Americans’ assessments of Bill Clinton, the results have failed to meet traditional 
standards of statistical significance.  
Having established that racial discrimination has a negligible impact on Indian-American 
partisanship when operating through a group consciousness, my next question is whether the 
already-existing theories of partisanship acquisition that I outline in my theory chapter are better 
able to explain why Indian-Americans coalesce under the Democratic Party. I evaluate the 
theories advanced by Downs, Fiorina, and Green, et al below. I close this analysis by including 
those three theories and my own in a single model to determine which theory or theories 
influence Indian-American partisanship the most.  
 
Downs 
 According to Downs, voters rationally weigh the benefits that they would accrue if a 
particular candidate were in office against the benefits that they would accrue if the opposing 
candidate were in office (Downs 1957). Voters then choose the candidate who increases their 
own well-being the most, either directly (by implementing impactful social programs that 
increase their quality of life, for example) or indirectly (by diverting resources toward other 
subpopulations that they support, like public education for children) (Downs 1957). Extending 
Downs’s theory, because Indian-Americans are, on average, very wealthy, they should favor the 
Republican Party because its platform advocates for lower rates of wealth redistribution, so 
people would be have to pay a smaller percentage of their income in taxes. In other words, their 
ideology manifests in a preference for a political party.  
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 To test this hypothesis, I regress partisanship on income, ideology, and a set of 
demographic controls. Income is coded intuitively, with higher incomes corresponding to a 
higher value in the regression. For ideology, the most liberal respondents are coded with the 
lowest values, while the most conservative respondents are coded with the highest values. 
Respondents were asked to self-report their ideologies. The results are below. 
 
Figure 4.6: A Test of Downs’s Theory of Partisanship 
 
 As we can see from the regression results above, while income does not appear to impact 
partisanship, the coefficient for ideology meets traditional standards of statistical significance. 
This may lend some credence to the notion that Indian-Americans’ political opinions drive their 
support for a particular party. While this explanation of partisanship is compelling, however, it 
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still leaves much to be desired because Downs’s theory does not explicitly mention partisanship, 
but rather a “standing decision” about the party that people support. That standing decision can 
shift when people decide that the opposing party’s policy proposals would substantially increase 
their utility. Fiorina extends Downs’s theory to include partisanship adoption. Therefore, to 
evaluate Fiorina’s theory of partisanship acquisition, I construct a separate model. 
 
Fiorina 
 Fiorina (1981) builds upon Downs’s work by positing an explanation for how Americans 
develop their party identification in the United States. Fiorina begins by claiming that party 
identification is unstable over time (87). Using data from the 1956-58-60 SRC Panel Study, 
Fiorina demonstrates that while only 15% of respondents changed their party identification from 
one party to another, more than 40% of respondents changed their position on a seven-point scale 
of partisanship. Based upon this claim, Fiorina argues that an individual’s party identification is 
the result of a carefully-considered comparison of her experiences with the two parties modified 
by a scalar that takes into account other factors that might influence a person’s party 
identification, such as her parents’ partisanship (90). Within the context of Indian-American 
partisanship, Fiorina might advance the hypothesis that one could predict Indian-Americans’ 
party identification by asking them how they feel about a salient issue, such as immigration.  
 To test Fiorina’s theory, I pull Indian-Americans’ responses to a question on whether 
immigration has had a negative impact on the economy in the respondents’ states. Affirmative 
answers to the question were coded as lower values, while negative answers to the question were 
coded as higher values. The responses to the question were the independent variable, with the 
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dependent variable as the partisanship scale that was used in the other models presented in this 
chapter. The results are below.     
 
Figure 4.7: A Test of Fiorina’s Theory of Partisanship 
 
These regression results indicate that there is a strong relationship between opinions on 
salient issues and party identification. Respondents who were more likely to view the impact that 
immigrants have on the economy in a negative light were more likely to support the GOP. 
Downs’s and Fiorina’s theories are not mutually exclusive; both predicate their theories upon the 
assumption that voters are able to rationally weigh their choices in an election to determine 
which candidate would increase their own well-being the most. However, for those who lack the 
social contextualization and connections necessary to evaluate candidates, there must be some 
other way to acquire partisanship. Green, Palmquist, and Schickler provide an alternative (2002). 
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Green, Palmquist, and Schickler (2002) 
Unlike Fiorina, Green, Palmquist, and Schickler find that people do not evaluate each 
party’s stances on policy issues that are important to them and then make a final decision on 
which party to support based upon those evaluations. Rather, people hold stereotypes of the 
parties and they associate specific groups, like Evangelical Christians or African-Americans, 
with each party (Green, et al 2002). People then choose a party to identify with by situating 
themselves according to how they feel as about the parties’ constituent groups (Green, et al 
2002). In this context, Green and colleagues would argue that Indian-Americans assess the social 
groups in the United States, associate them with the different political parties, and then orient 
themselves accordingly.  
To test this theory, I use Indian-Americans’ assessments of the frequency of anti-black 
discrimination as a proxy for feelings of warmth toward the black community. Because my 
theory is built upon the notion that experiences of discrimination link individuals together in a 
positive way, this proxy is consistent because recognizing shared experiences of discrimination 
should drive Indians to feel more warmly toward African-Americans (Craig and Richeson 2012). 
Lower values indicate that the respondent perceived a lot of anti-black discrimination, while 
higher values indicate the opposite. The dependent variable is the partisanship scale used in 







Figure 4.8: A Test of Green, et al’s Theory of Partisanship 
 
 These results support Green and colleagues’ theory of partisanship acquisition. However, 
it is important to note that this proxy is not perfect. Without a feelings thermometer, which the 
2016 CMPS does not include, I would not be able to test Green, et al’s theory with data that 
indicate Indian-Americans’ feelings of warmth and coolness toward African-Americans. 
However, these results are promising because they suggest a process available to individuals 
without access to social networks that is built up over the course of living in the United States for 
a significant period of time. 
 
Final Model 
When considered in independently of one another, all three explanations of partisanship 
acquisition presented in this section appear to impact Indian-Americans’ partisanship acquisition. 
As a final step, I compile the three theories, plus my own theory, into a single model to distill the 
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magnitude of each theory’s impact on partisanship acquisition. This should give us a better sense 
of  how exactly partisanship acquisition happens outside of the vacuum of theory. I present my 
results below.  
 
Figure 4.9: A Test of All Theories of Partisanship 
  
Interestingly, these results indicate that when accounting for alternative explanations for 
party identification, the existence of group consciousness does impact Indian-Americans’ 
partisanship. Perhaps counterintuitively, this effect only emerges once the model incorporates 
controls for Downs’s, Fiorina’s, and Green, et al’s explanations for party identification. This may 
be because the inclusion of those theories in the model reduce the amount of extraneous variation 
in the dependent variable, partisanship, that group consciousness cannot explain. Put otherwise, 
while Green, et al and Fiorina’s theories account for part of the reason that Indian-Americans 
coalesce in their support for the Democratic Party, they do not explain all of the reasons why 
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Indian-Americans do so. Group consciousness is one additional, previously-unexplained reason 
that explains Indian-Americans’ preference for the Democratic Party.  
Downs’s explanation of partisanship, which suggests that Indian-Americans should 
rationally align with the party that allows them to maximize their incomes, does not appear to 
explain Indian-Americans’ partisanship (1957). As the premise of this thesis indicates, this may 
be because Indian-Americans’ partisanship is not intuitive economically; Indian-Americans align 
with the Democratic Party despite their relatively high incomes. Therefore, it makes sense that 
this regression output does not find support for Downs’s model. If the model did support 
Downs’s theory, we should see a significant coefficient for income.  
This model indicates significant, but relatively lukewarm, support for Green and 
colleagues’ theory of partisanship. Green, et al (2002) suggest that individuals assess the social 
groups that they feel constitute each party and then orient themselves according to how warmly 
they feel toward those social groups. The low level of significance that we observe may arise 
because the proxy that I used to approximate Indian-Americans’ feelings of warmth toward 
African-Americans was imperfect. Because the CMPS did not directly ask its respondents to 
assess how they felt about other racial groups using feelings thermometers, I had to rely upon a 
question that asked Indian-Americans about how frequently they thought that blacks were 
discriminated against. Therefore, it could be the case that if I had data from a feelings 
thermometer to work with, this coefficient might meet a higher standard of significance.  
However, it may also be the case that the fact that Indian-Americans are relatively new to 
the United States might curb the explanatory power of Green, et al’s theory. The scholars’ theory 
hinges on the assumption that people can assess the groups that constitute each political party; if 
Indian-Americans are not sufficiently assimilated, they may not be able to do so. Indian-
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Americans’ low intermarriage rates with whites may already indicate that they have relatively 
low assimilation rates (Kalmijn and Van Tubergen 2010). Additionally, the fact that most Indian-
Americans’ families arrived in the US after 1965 suggests that Indian-Americans may not be as 
socially assimilated as other minorities with longer histories in the US are. Finally, scholarship 
indicates that even though second-generation Indian-Americans have experienced more social 
assimilation than first-generation Indian-Americans have, second-generation Indian-Americans 
(many of whom are just becoming old enough to vote) have still not experienced complete social 
and political assimilation (Misra 2009).  
Interestingly, the model that incorporates a control for Green, et al’s theory is the first 
model to exhibit a significant coefficient for group consciousness. This may be the case because 
Green and colleagues’ theory is predicated upon an individual being able to recognize and 
classify distinct social groups, which is also a necessary skill for recognizing the existence of 
Indian-American group consciousness. Indian-Americans need to be able to categorize 
themselves as a distinct racial group and recognize the similarities that bind them together for 
group consciousness to form within the racial group. By recognizing anti-Black discrimination, 
Indian-Americans exercise those skills in classifying Blacks as members of a distinct racial 
group and outlining an experience (discrimination) that many Blacks face. Therefore, it makes 
conceptual sense that the inclusion of a control for Green and colleagues’ theory should tease out 
a significant coefficient for group consciousness. 
These regression results most strongly support Fiorina’s theory of partisanship 
acquisition, which states that an individual’s opinions on salient issues drive her party 
identification (1981). To test this theory, I consulted answer to a question on whether 
immigration has a negative impact on the economy. According to this theory, people who believe 
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that immigration is detrimental to economic growth should align with the Republican Party, 
while people who believe that immigration does not adversely impact the economy should be 
Democrats. The regression output clearly indicates that Indian-Americans’ opinions on 
immigration strongly predict their partisanship. Every Indian-American has family members who 
were immigrants and many Indian-Americans came to the United States in pursuit of upward 
economic mobility (Chandrasekhar 1986), so the Indian-American CMPS respondents’ opinions 
align with their personal experiences.  
It could be the case that support for Fiorina’s theory would be less strong if I tested a 
question that fewer Indian-Americans had personal experiences with, like climate change. Due to 
time limitations on this thesis, I am unable to test whether Fiorina’s theory loses explanatory 
power when I test another salient issue. However, future scholarship should subject my findings 
to additional robustness checks to determine the validity of the relationship that I uncover above.  
 
Conclusion 
 The purpose of this chapter was to evaluate the relationship between Indian-Americans’ 
experiences of discrimination and their party identification. I determine that the impact of 
experiences of discrimination on Indian-Americans’ partisanship as it operates through through 
group consciousness is inconclusive. However, group consciousness appears to have a distinct 
impact on Indian-Americans’ partisanship, which emerges once I control for already-existing 
explanations for partisanship acquisition. In addition to group consciousness, I find support for 
Green and colleagues’ and Fiorina’s theories of party identification. Future scholarship should 
subject these findings to additional robustness checks to verify their validity.  
68 
 The fact that group consciousness influences Indian-Americans’ partisanship holds 
several primary implications for Indian-Americans’ political behavior. First, it demonstrates that 
for many group members, the Indian-American racial identity is politically salient. Second, it 
implies that Indian-Americans perceive a connection between their own lives and the well-being 
of their racial group that may map onto other contexts within politics. Finally, Indian-Americans’ 
group consciousness may color their political relationships with other Asian subgroups and, 






















If we only tried turning to already-existing theories for partisanship acquisition, scholars 
would not be able to explain why Vinod and the Patels support the Democratic Party. Their 
distinct socioeconomic statuses and education levels should stratify their party identification - 
while we might expect the Patels to align with the Democratic Party, Vinod appears more like 
what we might expect a Republican to look like. So why does he align himself with the Patels 
politically? 
 In this project, I argue that Vinod and the Patels coalesce under the Democratic Party in 
part because because they share group consciousness, they hold similar ideologies, and they 
assess the social groups that make up the Democratic and Republican Parties in a similar manner. 
In chapter 2, I provide an overview of literature on partisanship acquisition and explain why each 
theory cannot explain Indian-Americans’ political behavior. I evaluate explanations for Jewish-
American and Asian-American partisanship to see why members of those two groups coalesce 
under the Democratic Party despite experiencing socioeconomic stratification similar to that of 
Indian-Americans. Then, I advance an original theory of Indian-American partisanship, which 
posits that experiences of racial discrimination should facilitate group consciousness among 
Indian-Americans, which should, in turn, drive Indian-Americans toward the Democratic Party.  
 To explore examples of news coverage about Indian-Americans, I conduct a content 
analysis using articles from The New York Times and India Abroad in chapter 3 of this thesis. 
While I find that the news does cover instances of racial discrimination against Indian-
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Americans, it also frequently highlights Indian-Americans’ achievements. Furthermore, The New 
York Times writes about Indian-Americans and India Abroad covers instances of discrimination 
extremely infrequently, so there is a low likelihood of those newspapers making Indian-
Americans’ racial identities more salient by reminding Indian-Americans of discrimination that 
they had experienced. I conclude this chapter by evaluating other ways that Indian-Americans’ 
experiences of racial discrimination might manifest into group consciousness, such as informal 
social networks or religious institutions.  
 There are several other mechanisms that could facilitate an Indian-American group 
consciousness. For example, while The New York Times covers Indian-American affairs 
infrequently, other news outlets might cover the subject more. Furthermore, we do not know if 
the majority Indian-Americans use newspapers, or even traditional news media outlets (such as 
cable news or radio news programs), as their primary source of information. It could be the case 
that alternative mechanisms of information dissemination, like social media (Quenette and 
Velasquez 2018), community events (Masuoka 2006), and advocacy organizations, (Jones-
Correa, et al 2018) facilitate group consciousness.  
 In Chapter 4, I employ survey data to empirically assess whether experiences of racial 
discrimination facilitate group consciousness and whether that group consciousness, in turn, 
impacts Indian-Americans’ likelihood of identifying with the Democratic Party. This chapter 
demonstrates that while instances of racial discrimination do not appear to impact group 
consciousness, roughly half of the Indian-Americans surveyed perceive that group consciousness 
still exists, so group consciousness may still impact Indian-Americans’ partisanship, even  if that 
group consciousness is not necessarily conducted by experiences of racial discrimination, at least 
as measured by the CMPS survey item. Additionally, group consciousness does appear to drive 
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Indian-Americans toward the Democratic Party even when controlling for other explanations of 
partisanship acquisition. The final part of this chapter evaluates how these three theories might 
work in tandem to explain Indian-Americans’ support for the Democratic Party.  
 Looking ahead, one potential avenue for related research would be to assess how 
different intermediate steps may reinforce the salience of Indian-American group consciousness. 
For example, Jamal (2005) finds that for Muslim-Americans, the mosque is a vehicle for civic 
engagement. Furthermore, Muslims who live close to other Muslims and engage with their 
religion along with the Muslim community that they live in are more likely to vote and, when 
they vote, are more likely to vote for Democratic candidates (Ocampo, et al 2018). Previous 
scholarship demonstrates that religious institutions and other forms of religious infrastructure can 
serve to ground a recent immigrant in an already-existing social group (Min and Jang 2015). It is 
possible that for Indian-Americans, temples and the social networks that are attached to temples 
may drive individuals to bond with their co-ethnics, which would result in group consciousness.  
Another pathway for Indian-Americans’ partisanship is through informal social networks, 
which connect co-ethnics and encourage the formation of a larger group consciousness within 
the racial group. These social networks may be attached to religious groups, like Ocampo, et al 
(2018) demonstrate, or they can be secular (Sanchez 2008). These social groups would facilitate 
group consciousness in a similar manner to how religious infrastructure would do so; by creating 
bonds between co-ethnics, Indian-Americans may come to value the well-being of the entire 
racial group over their own individual well-being.  
 Jumping off of this research, scholars could also study whether a similar phenomenon 
unites the Indian diaspora in other contexts. There are Indian immigrants around the world. How 
do they form political attachments in their host countries? For example, do Indian-Canadians 
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coalesce under the Liberal Party in the same way that Indian-Americans coalesce under the 
Democratic Party in the United States? Indian-Canadians’ migration trajectories are distinct from 
many Indian-Americans’ migration trajectories, partly because Canada and India were once a 
part of the British Commonwealth at the same time (Bhatt and Iyer 2015). This means that 
historically, immigrating from India to Canada has been easier than immigrating from India to 
the United States (Bhatt and Iyer 2015). If Indian-Americans’ migration trajectories and 
settlement patterns in the US shape their political behavior, then it could be the case that Indian-
Canadians’ migration trajectories similarly impact how they interact with politics. Additionally, 
because Indian-Canadians’ migration trajectories tend to be distinct from Indian-Americans’, 
Indian-Canadians’ political behavior might also be distinct from Indian-Americans’.  
 In another context where the ethnic majority is non-white, do Indians in South Africa 
coalesce under the African National Congress, whose platform centers around racially-unifying 
the country after the end of Apartheid (de Jager and Steenekamp 2016)? Indians have a long 
history in South Africa, with the first inhabitants of the subcontinent initially setting foot in 
South Africa as indentured laborers in 1653 (Seedat-Khan and Johnson 2018). During Apartheid, 
Whites instrumentalized Indians to act as a buffer between Blacks and Whites, both 
economically and residentially (Vahed and Desai 2010). The social forces that acted upon 
Indians in South Africa are distinct from those that Indian-Americans and Indian-Canadians have 
ever faced. How do they manifest in Indian-South Africans’ preference for a political party? 
 A third potential avenue for future research explores the connection between Indian-
Americans and participating in elections. Survey data empirically establishes that 68% of Indian-
Americans identify with the Democratic Party, but there is relatively little research that explains 
other aspects of Indian-Americans’ political participation (Ramakrishnan 2017). At the current 
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moment, declared and potential presidential candidates are gearing up to campaign for the 2020 
election. With each election cycle, Asian-Americans coalesce more and more under the 
Democratic Party (Kuo, et al 2017). Will Indian-Americans continue to follow this broader 
trend? Additionally, Senator Kamala Harris, a candidate in the race, has a South Indian mother. 
Will a shared heritage draw Indians to vote for her? 
Another plausible research question about the connection between Indian-Americans and 
elections is whether Republican Indian-Americans vote more frequently than Democratic Indian-
Americans. Because an individual’s partisanship is the most accurate predictor of her vote 
choice, many campaigns run get out the vote efforts that target specific constituencies that 
already align with the campaign (Bartels 2000; García Bedolla and Michelson 2012). 
Scholarship frequently classifies racial minorities as solid constituents of the Democratic Party 
(Kuziemko and Washington 2018; Ostfeld 2018; Craig, et al 2018). If that is the case, then does 
it make sense for Democrats to target Indian-Americans, knowing that Indian-Americans are 
already inclined to be Democrats?  
Finally, future scholarship should attempt to disentangle Indian-American and Asian-
American partisanship. While that specific question is outside the scope of this thesis, Kuo, et al 
(2017) argue that the different Asian-American subgroups use the same decision-making process 
to align themselves with the Democratic Party. However, this research indicates that there may 
be an Indian-American-specific group consciousness that also partly explains Indian-Americans’ 
partisanship. How do distinct Indian-American and Asian-American partisanship acquisition 
mechanisms interact within the Indian-American community? 
 In sum, this thesis sets out to solve the puzzle of why Indian-Americans coalesce under 
the Democratic Party even though internal cleavages stratify the racial group. Because of their 
74 
relatively high average socioeconomic status and education level, we might expect Indian-
Americans to support the Republican Party. However, this project finds that due to a shared 
group consciousness, preference for a large/small government, and a similar assessment of the 
social groups that constitute the two parties, Indian-Americans tend to identify as Democrats. 
The dearth of scholarship about Indian-American political behavior underscores a gap in 
academic literature. However, by studying Indian-Americans further, future scholars can gain 
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